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NOTES AND COMMENT
Constitutional law: Schools; Right of Japanese in Hawaii to
direct education of child; Government power of control.
The Supreme Court of the United States has added a fourth rock
to the foundation of parental right to control the education of their
children.

In Farrington,et al. v. Tokushige, et al.1 a temporary injunction was
granted by the U. S. District Court of Hawaii forbidding the enforcement of certain Acts of the Hawaii Legislature. The Circuit Court
of Appeals2 affirmed the interlocutory decree, and the Supreme Court
affirmed the action of the Court of Appeals.
The nature of the Acts and the regulations issued thereunder were
to intimately regulate schools wherein foreign language was taught.
The aim of the Act was to insure the Americanization of the foreign

speaking children, i.e., Korean, Chinese, and Japanese, through attendance and instruction at public or approved private schools, and to direct
their studies while at the foreign language schools.
The Act provided for the licensing of the latter type of schools and
the teachers thereof, for the imposition of a fee in accordance with attendance, for the conduct of such schools as subservient to the approved private or public schools, for the regulation of the textbooks,
and for the inspection and general control of such privately supported
institutions.
As ever, the power to regulate and tax was found to border on the
power to destroy. The Supreme Court, by Justice McReynolds, interpreted the facts as follows, at page 453 :
The foregoing statement is enough to show that the School Act and the
measures adopted thereunder go far beyond mere regulation of privately supported schools when children obtain instruction deemed valuable by their parents
and which is not obviously in conflict with any public interest. They give
affirmative direction concerning the intimate and essential details of such schools,
intrust this control to public officers, and deny both owners and patrons reasonable
choice and discretion in respect of teachers, curriculum and textbooks. Enforcement of the act probably would destroy most, if not all, of them; and, certainly,
it would deprive parents of fair opportunity to procure for their children instruction which they think important and we cannot say is harmful. The Japanese
parent has the right to direct the education of his own children without unreasonable restrictions; the constitution protects him as well as those who speak
another tongue.

And at page 454:
We, of course, appreciate the grave problems incident to the large alien population of the Hawaiian Islands. These should be given due weight whenever
Decided February 21, 1927, 71 Law Ed. 45.
Fed. (2d) 710.
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the validity -f any government regulation of private schools is under consideration; but the limitations of the constitution must not be transcended.

. The Supreme Court cited Meyer v. Nebraska,' Bartels v. Iowa,4
and Pierce v. Society of Sisters,5 to the general point of the rights
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to owners, parents and children in respect of attendance upon schools against adverse action by
the States.
The advance made in the present decision, is the establishment of
the proposition that the inhibition of the Fifth Amendment that "no
person shall .

. .

. be deprived of life, liberty or property without

due process of'law" protects the fundamental rights of the individual
against action by the Federal Government, and by the agencies set
up congress for the government of the territories, as the territorial
legislature or officers, as is secured by the Fourteenth Amendment
which declares that no "state" shall "deprive any person of life,
liberty or property without due process of law," against action considered in the cases cited above on the part of the States.
H.W.I.
Corporations: Officers and directors, guaranteeing corporation's
notes, cannot recover from other stockholders on the ground that
corporation was incompletely organized.
In the instant case' a number of farmers attempted to organize a
corporation called the Blair Farmers' Exchange. Subscriptions were
signed, a meeting of the subscribers was held, and the corporation
commenced business in 1go. Its present officers and directors from
time to time gave corporate notes to the home bank of Blair, of which
they became joint endorsers and guarantors. In 1921 the corporation
suspended business, and in 1923 the bank sued upon the unpaid notes,
joining as defendants those officers and directors, who now appear as
plaintiffs, and who had endorsed and guaranteed the notes. The bank
had judgment, the officers and directors paid the judgment and now
seek contribution from the other stockholders. They base their ground
for recovery upon a violation of section i8o.o6, pleading that less than
50 per cent of the authorized capital had been subscribed at the time
they assumed the obligation of guarantors, and assuming therefore,
that the stockholders were personally liable as a violation of section
18o.o6.
The basis of the asserted liability under this action was the implied
promise of the corporation that it would reimburse the guarantors in
the amount paid by them in the discharge of its obligations. The court,
however, held that this implied obligation of the corporation, is one
arising between the corporation and members of the corporation and
not one contracted in violation of the statute. Upon this principle the
court decided that no liability exists on the part of the defendants
to the plaintiffs.
'262 U.S. 4o4.
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